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Abstract
Traditionally in a public goods model, individuals decide whether
or not to contribute to the good based off of the actions of their neigh-
bors, and a pre–determined payoff parameter that will tend to be uni-
form for all actors in the network. This decision–making process for an
individual actor to contribute to a public good has historically been
instrumental in providing the theoretical framework for the conser-
vation of public goods. In this study, an existing proposition in the
literature claiming that if the absolute value of the minimum eigen-
value of the adjacency matrix is less than the inverse of the payoff
parameter, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium, is tested. In this
process, the condition that one payoff parameter must be utilized for
all the agents in the network is relaxed, and is tested on two random-
ized network models: the Erdős–Rényi and Stochastic Block Models.
Then, the existence of both unique and multiple Nash equilibria, and
their location as interior or exterior solutions are explored in relation
to the number and range of the different payoff parameters. Utilizing
methods ubiquitously utilized in applied mathematics analysis, it be-
comes apparent that the number of Nash equilibria notably increases
once the payoff parameters in the network rise above a threshold value.
1
Acknowledgement
This culmination of my undergraduate work in both mathematics and eco-
nomics would not have been possible without the help many individuals both
on the way to completing this, and at the end of my undergraduate years.
First, I must give my utmost thanks to my thesis adviser and mentor, Dr.
Peter Mucha, who served to inspire me in ways that I never believed were
possible. Without his constant help and patience, this work would not have
been possible.
An additional thanks must also be given to Dr. Geetha Vaidyanathan
who has also proved to be an extraordinary help as she continuously pushed
and guided me through the thesis-writing process.
A most warm-hearted sense of gratitude must also go to several of my eco-
nomics and mathematics professors throughout my time here at UNC-Chapel
Hill such as Dr. Idris Assani in the Mathematics Department along with Dr.
Boone Turchi and Dr. Gary Biglaiser in the Economics Department, that
continuously inspired me to love my work, and challenged me academically
and personally in the most extraordinary of ways. Without their assistance
and patience, I would not have fallen in love so deeply with my academic
disciplines in ways that I did not expect four years ago.
Lastly, but definitely not least, a special thanks to my parents, who have
consistently inspired me with their own thesis stories from their Undergrad-
uate and Doctorate/Masters years. They never fail to show me that through






3 Methods and Results 12
3.1 Logical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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The costs and benefits of contributing to a public good have rarely been
viewed as a one–sided problem; nor has it been viewed as a hierarchical one.
Such a problem has been central to game theory literature, and the makeup
of the individual actors in the problem has posited a multifaceted problem
that has been explored by economists for years (Bramoullé, Kranton and
D’Amours, 2013). No one actor is solely responsible for contributing to a
public good, nor are the benefits of accumulating the public good uniquely
owned by one individual. Additionally, the interactions between actors can
be modeled by a network/graph, or matrix that describe the interactions
between the actors. Due to the fact that the actors that surround a given
player determine the payoff of each actor, we can observe that the shape and
dynamics of the entire network mold the outcomes that ultimately result
from the players’ strategic interactions.
This paper examines how network dynamics in public goods models, and
their consequent Nash equilibria as presented in Bramoullé, Kranton and
D’Amours (2013) can be utilized in order to further understand how hetero-
geneous payoffs affect network dynamics. While the previous literature was
heavily reliant upon a singular payoff value for all players in the game, this
paper seeks to expand on the findings as explained in theoretical models. The
research in Public Goods is mostly reliant upon simple structures, and while
this does allow for more straightforward solutions and propositions, it is not
necessarily indicative of real–world conditions. In most realistic situations, it
may be reasonably assumed that actors do not all adhere to an unchangeable
payoff; individuals are different and place different values to their own and
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others’ actions.
The kind of analysis in this paper is conducted via computational methods
heavily utilized in applied mathematics. The payoff parameters, randomly
chosen from a normal distribution truncated at zero and one, affect the num-
ber of Nash equilibria found in a given network. Furthermore, the main
questions explored throughout this paper are at which points, and for which
network structures, based off of the minimum eigenvalue of the network, do
we begin to see the propositions results unravel (Cimini and Sánchez, 2014)?
Do we come to a different result in the case of an Erdős–Rényi model versus
a simplistic line-model in the game theoretic dynamics? Additionally, the
answers to these questions are most efficiently approximated using a linear
convergence method that is omnipresent in the literature that seeks to find
numerical approximations more efficiently than the pursuit of exact values
provides.
The two most utilized payoff models in the case of public goods take
into account two different types of interactions: one that involves a linear
payoff model, and another that implies a quadratic payoff. The linear payoff
model is most utilized in the payoff functions of the strategic contributions
of public good models, as it directly incorporates a parameter by which the
goods provided by the neighbors are direct substitutes for the goods provided
by the reference actor. The quadratic payoff model on the other hand, takes
into account negative externalities that incorporate the fact that each actor
is hurt by its neighbors’ actions (Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours, 2013).
For the purposes of this paper, the focus will lie on the linear payoff model,
where goods are contributed at a cost to the individual reference actor, and
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the actors’ neighbors contribute to the overall utility the individual actor
receives. Additionally, this payoff model is contingent upon a utility or payoff
function that is “differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave” in respect to
the action chosen by the actor (Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours, 2013).
A variety of ways of looking at the contributions and costs of contribut-
ing to public goods have been explored, mostly varying in the substitutabil-
ity of contributions of the individual actors and their neighbors. Most re-
cently, an exploration of public goods that are non-excludible to their neigh-
bors have had stable solutions solely limited to equilibria in which some ac-
tors contribute while others merely “free–ride” and do not contribute at all
(Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours, 2013). However, it must also be taken
into account that the Nash equilibria for basic star, line or circle graphical
models where few nodes and simple connections are made, have been tested
as examples for the purposes of illustrating this and other results that appear
in Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours’s work. As it appears in other liter-
ature regarding game theory and its applications to network theory, game
theorists rarely illustrate examples of their model past such simple examples,
for the sake of both simplicity and computational ease.
Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours describe several propositions, which
explore the relationships between the makeup of the network, the designated
“payoff(s)” that result from certain actions, and the differences in network
dynamics and outcomes that result from having either active or inactive
agents. Perhaps the most notable outcome of the research comes to the con-
clusion that if the absolute value of the minimum eigenvalue of the adjacency
matrix is lower than the inverse of the payoff value, there is a unique Nash
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Equilibrium; otherwise, multiple Nash equilibria may exist. Additionally, a
biconditional statement is obtained in that absolute value of the minimum
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix for any regular graph is lower than the
inverse of any payoff value in a regular graph, there is a unique Nash equilib-
rium (Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours, 2013). Within these propositions,
the one that evokes the most promise for the purposes of this research is the
first, in that it allows for the most space for exploration in interpretations of
the structure of the network.
In the section titled ‘Model’, a derivation of the theoretical framework
as found in the literature is explored. In the ‘Methods and Results’ section,
the results from the numerical modeling mechanisms utilized to explore the
products of differing payoff structures are presented with a brief explana-
tion as to the linear convergence method utilized to achieve the results. In
the ‘Discussion’ section, the limitations and applications of the results are
explored, and additional suggestions as to their implementation in further
research are perused.
2 Model
Most of the literature that explores the contribution to public goods within
the context of a network lies in exploring the theoretical framework, limits
of the interactions among actors, and the end–results that arise from such
propositions. The most general of propositions for the purposes of this paper
within the public goods models of game theory, and the relationship to the
network structure and the consequent eigenvalues lie in Bramoullé, Kranton
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and D’Amours (2013). Their work and contribution to the public good model
allows for a general approach to both a given payoff value, and the structure
of the network itself, and serves as the structure for analysis throughout this
paper.
As presented in the work by Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours (2013),
the model begins with n agents, or nodes. Each node, or agent i selects
an action denoted by xi ≥ 0 from the vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) where x−i
represents the other actions available, not including the action of agent i.
The way in which any two nodes or agents, i or j, are associated, is denoted
by the adjacency matrix G in which gij = gji = 1 if the agents are linked
and equal to 0 otherwise. The payoff parameter is denoted by δ ≥ 0, and
the collection of gij, gji create the nxn matrix G. The utility, or payoff
derived by agent i is denoted by Ui(xi,x−i; δ,G). Agent i’s best reply to
the action of all other agents is then represented as xi = fi(x−i; δ,G), or
the action that maximizes i’s utility given x−i, δ, and G. Additionally, the
set of Nash equilibria outcomes is represented by x∗, which satisfy the best
replies of all agents, or nodes in the network such that x∗i = fi(x
∗
−i; δ,G) for
∀i : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours (2013) indicate that the linear payoff
model for public goods within a network in which the good is local, is defined
as




such that bi(∗) is differentiable and b′i(0) > κi > b′i(+∞) for ∀i, strictly
increasing, and concave in xi. Additionally, κi > 0 is i’s marginal cost of
taking action xi such that xi satisfies b
′(xi) = κi (where marginal cost of an
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individual’s action is equivalent to the marginal benefit of the actors action
in addition to the marginal benefit of the actor’s neighbor). If one takes the




−i; δ,G) = xi − δ
∑






−i; δ,G) = 0 otherwise (2)
Here, the threshold value denoted by xi is the value at which the actor i
decides whether or not to contribute to the public good based off of both
their own and their neighbors’ actions; if the cumulative actions of his/her
neighbors contribute less than xi, the actor will contribute until the desired
value is reached, and will contribute nothing otherwise.
For the purposes of both the expansion and analysis of Bramoullé, Kran-
ton and D’Amours’s 2013 work in accordance with their analysis, the best
reply function 2, can be written as




where xi = x for ∀i and normalized such that x ≡ 1.
The model as presented by Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours (2013)
and Ballester and Zenou (2006) consequently has several implications in the
dynamics and number of Nash equilibria that result. Distinguishing between
vectors of the actions of active agents (xA), the associations among solely
active agents (GA), active and inactive agents (GN−A,AxA), and the identity
matrix (I), given the best replies noted above, the following conclusion is
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reached
Theorem 1. The vector of actions with active agents A are a Nash
Equilibrium if and only if
(I + δGA)xA = 1
δGN−A,AxA ≥ 1 (4)
Monderer and Shapley (1996) then utilize a symmetric oligopoly Cournot
competition game, in which the cost function, similarly to Bramoullé, Kran-
ton and D’Amours’s work is defined linearly with a set marginal cost such
that ci(xi) = cxi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and the inverse demand function D(X),
in which X > 0 is only assumed to be positive. Each actor’s profit is
then defined as ξi(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = D(X)xi − cxi in which X =
∑n
j=1 xj
on Rn++. Additionally, a function T is defined such that T : Rn++ → R and
T (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = x1x2 . . . xn(D(X) − c). Then it may be concluded that
for every actor i, and ∀x−i ∈ Rn−1++ , ξi(xi,x−i) − ξi(x′i,x−i) > 0 if any only
if T (xi,x−i) − T (x′i,x−i) > 0, ∀x′i, xi ∈ R++. The function T that meets
these conditions is then determined as an ordinal potential game. We then
form the inverse demand function, D, such that D(Q) = a − bQ, a, b > 0
and costs are defined as a function ci(xi) where i ≤ i ≤ n. If we take into
account the following quadratic function described as T ∗((x1, x2, ...xn)) =
a
∑n








j=1 cj(xj). Then, if ∀i, and
∀x−i, x′i, xi if ξi(xi,x−i) − ξi(x′i,x−i) = T ∗(xi, xi,x−i) − T ∗(x′i, xi,x−i), the
function T ∗ is determined to be a potential function. As such, any change in
i’s action changes the payoff and therefore the value of the potential by the
exact same amount. An observation is then made that if all the actors choose
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to jointly maximize the potential function T ∗, an equilibrium is reached. Ad-
ditionally, we may conclude that there exists at most one potential function,
and consequently one function that satisfies the criteria described above.
Therefore, the actions x are at a Nash equilibrium if and only one maximizes
the potential function
maxxT
∗(x; δ,G)subject to the constraints ∀i, xi ≥ 0 (5)
If we also take into account the Kuhn–Tucker conditions, we come to the
conclusion that for xi,
∂T ∗
∂xi
≤ 0 and xi = 0; or ∂T
∗
∂xi
= 0 and xi = 0. As
Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours’s (2013) and Monderer and Shapley (1996)
claim, due to the fact that the earlier equivalence relation determines that
the payoff of an individual actor’s actions mirror the Potential Function, we
may also determine that such a biconditional statement implies that each
actor in equilibrium chooses an action that maximizes the potential, given
the way other actors are anticipated to act.
For potential game, P , the vector of actions x are a Nash equilibria if
and only if the conditions of 5, which are mirrored by individual actors’ best
replies are met. According to Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours’s (2013),
we reach such a conclusion by choosing a continuous twice-differentiable pay-
off function, ξi such that its corresponding potential function, T
∗
i can be
rewritten as T ∗i (x; δG) = x
T1− 1
2
xT (I + δG)x. Hence, we may conclude:
Lemma 1. The set of Nash equilibria for a given G and δ are in
accordance with the set of saddle points and local maxima of 5 on Rn+
Additionally, we observe that T ∗ is positive definite if and only if |λmin(G)| <
1/δ, in which |λmin(G)| is defined as the absolute value of the minimum
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eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, G. We then achieve with the help of
Ballester, Calvó–Armengol & Zenou’s (2006) work, the following result:
Theorem 2. If |λmin(G)| <
1
δ
, there is a unique Nash equilibrium (6)
Additionally, Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours (2013) conclude the fol-
lowing important result, which proves imperative for the later analysis that
follows:
Theorem 3. For any δ and any graph G, if |λmin(G)| >
1
δ
, there is at
least one Nash equilibrium that is a corner solution (7)
According to the work of Monderer and Shapley (1996), one can rein-
troduce a new network that is weighted by the individual payoffs so that
all the above results, with the exception of Theorem 4 may still apply.





δjgij. From here, we may then conclude that the potential func-
tion is strictly concave if |λmin(G̈)| < 1, and therefore, that a unique solution
exists.
3 Methods and Results
3.1 Logical Framework
This paper seeks to evaluate the claim of Equation 6 for different structures
that are not provided by Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours (2013) such as
that of the Stochastic Block Model and the Erdős–Rényi graphs (Kolaczyk
2009). Additionally, it seeks to relax the condition that all players must have
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the same payoff, and while an alternative method is presented with a similarly
structured best reply as in Equation 3, it does not provide an analysis or
framework to the dynamics of the network and consequent Nash equilibria
that occur when the distribution of payoffs are larger or smaller. Additionally,
in the case of Equation 6, the conditions that determine the value one should
utilize for δ when there are many payoffs so that the Theorem remains true
are further explored.
The previous literature in the analysis of Nash equilibria for these sys-
tems as indicated in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) implies the use of a direct
calculation of the solutions that reach a Nash equilibria where no individ-
ual actor can reach a higher utility if they unilaterally deviate from their
selected action. However, it becomes evident that such an algorithm requires
a great deal of computational time, as it relies upon the condition set in
calculating the Nash equilibria as shown in Theorem 1. The method of con-
sequently computing all Nash equilibria, as offered by Bramoullé, Kranton
and D’Amours (2013) dependent upon one ubiquitous payoff, involves look-
ing at a set x, and graph G with agents N and singular payoff δ. If we let
subset S ⊂ N, we then continue to compute xS = (I+ δGS)−11 and allow for
xN−S = 0. If both xS ≥ 0 and δGN−S,SxS ≥ 1, then x is a Nash Equilibrium.
Then, one proceeds to check for all subsets S of N with a total of 2n subsets.
Consequently, the number of Nash equilibria may also be exponential, and
therefore any other alternative method of computing the exact values of the
Nash equilibria will have the added problem of running in exponential time.
This problem in computation will get more difficult to surmount as one
utilizes more than one payoff value. As a result, an estimation method most
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commonly utilized in the methods of numerical analysis is now utilized to
estimate the Nash equilibria utilizing the constraints placed by Equation 3.
This method of computation most-utilized in numerical analysis follows the
following in which γ ∈ (0, 1):
xn+1 = γxn+1 + (1− γ)xn or xn+1 − γxn+1 = xn − γxn (8)
Utilizing randomized values picked from a uniform distribution between zero
and one, this method seeks to look at the continuous distribution of actions
an actor can choose until the initial (xn) and final values (xn+1) converge.
The algorithm picks N2 vectors of these randomized action values in an effort
to capture the full space implied by the full domain of the possible solutions
of the actions as found in [0, 1]N , and then performs the method indicated
by Equation 8 to find the full range of possible Nash equilibria. It is also
important to note that the set of payoff parameters, δij are chosen from a
Standard Normal distribution truncated by zero and one, and values are
picked from a distribution with a desired standard deviation and mean. The
mean and distribution of the payoff parameters in the best response func-
tion, δij ∈ [0, 1]. Additionally, the structure of the graph of Erdős–Rényi in
contrast to the Stochastic Block model, is explored in the following analysis
in conjunction with the ability of Equation 6 to hold to the mean of a het-
erogeneous set of payoff parameters. For the entirety of the results below, a
γ of 0.1 was utilized in an effort to maintain an efficient computation time
while still capturing a strong sense of accuracy in the calculations of the Nash
equilibria.
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To observe the influences of both a widening and narrowing of a distribu-
tion of the payoff parameters, an Erdős–Rényi graph with N = 30 actors
is constructed with probability of connection p = .8, and with a variety of
|λmin(G̈)|. In this situation, if we fix the mean of the deltas at δ = .8 so that
|λmin(G̈)| > 1, and consequently, Equation 6 clearly no longer holds, we get
the following results as demonstrated by Figure 1.
These results imply that when the mean of the payoff values utilized is
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Figure 2: Nash equilibria for mean delta of 0.8
Figure 3: Probability of uniqueness for mean delta of 0.8
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Table 1: Standard Deviation vs. Number of Equilibria and Probability of
Uniqueness, See Figures 2 & 3.






















significantly above the threshold described in Equation 6, a wider distribution
of δij leads to a greater likelihood of having one unique Nash Equilibrium. As
is apparent by Figure 1, Equation 6 never holds for all 100 iterations, even as
the payoff distribution widens. Additionally, it is evident that the tighter the
distribution as indicated by the standard deviation results in a much greater
number of Nash equilibria. As the standard deviation increases, the number
of Nash equilibria gets significantly smaller in a linear manner.
If we begin to look at the proportion of times that one reaches a unique
Nash equilibria for a given set of standard deviations as the third column
in Table 1 suggests, we come to the conclusion that for such a high average
δ, the wider the distribution, the more likely a unique Nash equilibrium will
consistently exist. However, despite this fact, it still remains highly unlikely
that a unique Nash equilibrium will occur, reaching a maximum likelihood
of uniqueness at 0.35.
Now, if we take a δ more closely aligned to the values implied by |λmin(G)| <
1 such that the mean payoff, or δ = .3 fits very neatly around the constraints
set by Equation 6, we arrive to the representations in Figures 4, 5, 6, and
Table 2 of the proportion of times one is able to arrive at a unique Nash
equilibrium and the number of Nash equilibria one obtains on average. In
this case, |λmin(G̈)| < 1, as demonstrated by Figure 4 once again does not
hold true, but it is also important to note that unique Nash equilibria are
almost consistently found.
At first glance, the fact that the mean δ was set to be 0.3 such that
Equation 6 does not hold for this Erdős–Rényi network structure suggests
that finding unique Nash equilibria would still be unlikely. As a result, the
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Figure 4: |λmin(G̈)| for mean delta of 0.3 for all 100 iterations and widening
standard deviations
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Figure 5: Nash equilibria for mean delta of 0.3
Figure 6: Probability of uniqueness for mean delta of 0.3
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Table 2: Standard Deviation vs. Number of Equilibria and Probability of
Uniqueness, See Figures 5 & 6.






















fact that for standard deviations running in increments of 0.01 from 0 to
0.19 reflected a very consistent outcome of finding only unique Nash equi-
libria suggest that in this case, widening the distribution of δij did nothing
to affect the network dynamics. An extremely high probability (nearly al-
ways 1) of achieving a unique Nash equilibria is observed, despite the fact
that uniqueness is not guaranteed by Equation 6. Additionally, the average
number of Nash equilibria calculated as the distribution widened was also
observed to consistently stay at or near 1. One might begin to conclude that
when the mean falls close to the constraints of Equation 6, the distribution
of δij has little effect on the equilibrium outcomes of the system. It is also
important to note that throughout the testing of both payoff models, not a
single interior solution was found, and the only Nash equilibria found were
those containing values such that ∃i : xi = 0
3.2.2 Stochastic Block Model
The analysis for Figures 7 through 12 were conducted on the basis of a
network randomized by the methods of the stochastic block model. This
network was created for the purposes of this analysis through the creation
of two Erdős–Rényi graphs with probability of connection p1 = .4 and p2 =
.9, respectively, that were consequently tiled to create one matrix that is
symmetric across the diagonal.
In the Stochastic Block Model, when Equation 6 no longer holds true as
|λmin(G̈)| is no longer less than one, as determined by Figure 7 it becomes
quite clear that the average numbers of Nash equilibria remain extremely
high even as the distribution of the standard normal curve widens. As was
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Figure 7: |λmin(G̈)| for mean delta of 0.8 for all 100 iterations and widening
standard deviations of stochastic block model
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Figure 8: Nash equilibria for mean delta of 0.8 of stochastic block model
Figure 9: Probability of uniqueness for mean delta of 0.8 for stochastic block
model
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Table 3: Standard Deviation vs. Number of Equilibria and Probability of
Uniqueness, See Figures 9 & 10.






















the case previously, when the distribution is extremely narrow, the number
of Nash equilibria remains high, and decrease in a linear fashion, similarly to
that observed for the Erdős–Rényi structure in Figure 2. A few more Nash
equilibria in comparison to the Erdős–Rényi structure are found for each
incrementally wider distribution of the payoff parameter. In Figure 9, it be-
comes evident that the probability of achieving a unique Nash Equilibrium
remains low throughout all widening distributions. The low, nearly nonex-
istent probability of achieving a Nash equilibria remains consistent through
all standard deviations. Consequently, that probability never increases be-
yond 0.02, a trend that stands in serious contrast to the results of Figure
3, perhaps due to the fact that the |λmin(G̈)| values are significantly larger
and almost double of those found in Figure 1. However, it is important to
note that there are additional factors that may go into the average quantity
of Nash equilibria in the network structure that are not solely attributed
to the minimum eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, as the probability of
uniqueness for each incrementally wider distribution is substantially smaller
in comparison to the Erdős–Rényi structure.
Next, we take into account what might occur if the requirements of Equa-
tion 6 are not met for the stochastic block model, but are very close to the
‘threshold’ value of 1. As is apparent by the results immediately proceeding
Figure 10, the absolute value of the minimum eigenvalue of the weighted
adjacency matrix never falls below the threshold value of 1. The following
outcomes in Figures 11, 12, and Table 4 appear to be quite similar to those
of the Erdős–Rényi graph.
In the case of Table 4, as the distribution widens, the quantity of Mean
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Figure 10: |λmin(G̈)| for mean delta of 0.3 for all 100 iterations and widening
standard deviations of stochastic block model
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Figure 11: Nash equilibria for mean delta of 0.3 of stochastic block model
equilibria remains fairly constant similar to the results of Table 2. The mean
number of Nash equilibria only varies from one to being slightly greater
than one. This might be attributed to the fact that a Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed to exist for any game played due to the results of Brouwer’s Fixed
Point Theorem. As a result, the values for the mean payoff have a minimum
value according to the theorem. These results imply that for mean values of
δij that lie within the constraints of Equation 6 as was the case for both graph
structures in this analysis, the average number of Nash equilibria remains at
1. One might then expect from the results of this figure that in Figure 12 we
would consistently find the probabilities to remain at or near one.
The trend seen in Figures 11 and 12 demonstrates a consistent trend in
achieving a unique Nash equilibrium for each incremental widening in the
28
Figure 12: Probability of uniqueness for mean delta of 0.3 for stochastic block
model
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distribution of δij. If one looks closely at Table 4, it becomes evident that
the number of Nash equilibria closely mirror the probability of uniqueness,
and thus reflect precision in the results. As previously maintained, these
results are also consistent with the results of Table 2 which suggest that a
unique Nash equilibrium is almost always reached in the case of heterogenous
payoffs. This also occurs regardless of the wideness of distribution of the
payoffs between the values of σ ∈ [0, .19].
Once again, it is important to observe that as was the case with the results
of the Erdős–Rényi network, not a single Nash Equilibrium found in either
rendition of the payoff structures was an interior solution, and instead, each
solution was observed as a corner solution with at least one inactive player.
4 Discussion
The results of the two network structures differ most notably in the qualities
by which they are affected by the distribution of the payoff parameters when
they do not adhere to the conditions imposed by Equation 6. Otherwise, the
results for the two structures when they fall to the ’threshold’ value of 1 are
nearly identical in their ability to continuously find only one unique Nash
Equilibrium.
When the payoff parameters become significantly larger (in the case of
this analysis, average δij = 0.8) so that Equation 6 very clearly does not hold,
some significant distinctions become evident in the distribution while other
results remain extremely similar. Despite the fact that the mean number of
equilibria found was fairly similar, their sensitivity to a widening distribution
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Table 4: Standard Deviation vs. Number of Equilibria and Probability of
Uniqueness, See Figures 11 & 12.






















of payoff parameters in the case of looking at uniqueness differs significantly.
In the case of the Erdős–Rényi structure, with a smaller |λmin(G̈)| than was
the case with the stochastic block model, the mean number of Nash equilibria
was found to decrease at a similar rate to that of the stochastic block model.
The network models produce notable differing trends in the probability
that a unique equilibrium is reached. In the case of the proportion of times a
unique equilibrium is reached, it must be noted that in the case of the Erdős–
Rényi structure, a significantly higher probability is achieved for greater dis-
tributions, while in the case of the stochastic block model the probability of
achieving a unique Nash equilibria remain fairly nonexistent throughout. In
the former case, a curvilinear trend in the probability of achieving uniqueness
as the distribution widens is observed. In the latter such behavior is never
realized, and unique Nash equilibria almost never occurs. Additionally, it is
important to note that the |λmin(G̈)| for the stochastic block model is signif-
icantly larger (in some cases, almost double) than what is exhibited in the
Erdős–Rényi structure. However, despite this, it seems very apparent that
the widening of the distribution of the payoff parameters has a significant
effect on the ability of the game to obtain unique Nash equilibria that does
not mirror the trends observed in the effects of an increasing distribution
on the average number of Nash equilibria. Thus, it might be possible that
another factor other than |λmin(G̈)| might have an effect on the ability of the
network to achieve a unique Nash equilibria. While an immediately iden-
tifiable suggestion as to why this occurred is not immediately present from
the results obtained, it might be suggested that further exploration into the
effects of the mean degree of nodes in the network on Equation 6 be explored
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in further research (Cimini and Sánchez, 2014).
A concern that may arise with the derivation of the Nash equilibria and
the convergence method utilized is the possibility of one interfering with
the stability of the Nash equilibria in the network whether it be asymptotic
or otherwise (Bramoullé, Kranton and D’Amours, 2011). However, if one
uses the algorithm suggests in this paper the algorithm only runs into the
problem of computational roundoff error which can result in a bifurcation of
the results such that an individual action in xn and xn+1 will ‘orbit’ between
a few values around the true solution. This then implies that the algorithm
is not in fact looking for only stable solutions as the difference between xn
and xn+1 would be reasonably expected to be much more significant than
that of which is found to be further than seven significant figures away, as is
utilized in the algorithm.
The truncation of the Standard Normal distribution utilized to pick the
values of δij has an effect on the realized mean and standard deviation of
the payoff parameters. As a result, one must take into account that if the
mean for δij is taken in the extremes of the interval [0, 1], the mean and
standard deviation will be altered in ways that were not originally intended.
For example, if a mean is chosen on the upper end of the interval near one, it
might be reasonably expected that the realized distribution will no longer be
clearly ‘standard normal’ but instead will be significantly skewed towards the
lower bounds of the distribution as the “upper tail” will be expected to be
cut short. Such logic is reasonably present in the distributions of |λmin(G̈)|
in Figures 1, 4, 7, and 10. As the distributions become wider, the mean
values of |λmin(G̈)| become smaller in the case of when the mean δij was 0.8,
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and larger in the case when the mean δij was 0.3. As such, we must take
into account that the standard deviations and means are not as clear as the
results suggest. In future research, it might be advisable to perhaps see the
results of the effects of other distributions on the payoff structures, δij.
The randomization of the assignments of δij to the various actors in the
network further mutes the effects of differing clustering patterns that are
present in the stochastic block model. As a result, it is suggested that the
average number of Nash equilibria obtained and the probability of achiev-
ing a unique equilibria be calculated for assigned δij. The greater δij should
be assigned to one cluster, and the lesser to the other cluster, and the re-
sults taken note of. Such an analysis would be reasonable in the realistic
applications as actors within a clustering might be expected to have similar
payoffs to the contribution of a public good as the individuals they associate
themselves with.
The lack of any interior solutions throughout the derivation of all the
results stands in contrast to some of the results obtained by Bramoullé,
Kranton and D’Amours (2013) for simple structures. Such structures were
only identified in examples restricted to a simple line graph with four agents,
a star graph with n agents, a ‘prism’ structure with six agents, etc. and a
homogenous payoff structure. All in all, the examples presented indicated
that interior equilibria were found with a great degree of restriction, which
was not the objective in the construction of the randomized networks of the
Erdős–Rényi or Stochastic Block Model. For further analysis, one could look
to see what kind of structures would be necessary to find interior solutions
in the case of heterogenous payoff structures.
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5 Conclusion
This paper viewed the implications of the distribution of heterogenous pay-
off parameters in a public goods model where goods are substitutable. By
testing the distribution of the payoff parameters on two payoff structures,
that of the Erdős–Rényi graph and of the Stochastic Block model, this
paper expanded on existing literature by looking at the implications of a
stochastically-determined set of heterogenous payoff parameters δij. For all
these solutions, no interior Nash equilibria were found, and only corner so-
lutions were obtained. In the case in which |λmin(G̈)| < 1 does not hold for
the network structures, it becomes clear that more qualities of the network
than simply the λmin has implications on the number of solutions.
When the network structures closely followed the conditions of |λmin(G̈)| <
1, it was found that the payoff distribution’s standard deviation had little to
no effect on the number and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibria. However,
the results were not identical for the stochastic block model and the Erdős–
Rényi networks in that the stochastic block model arrived at unique Nash
equilibria much less frequently than the Erdős–Rényi structures.
Policymakers should take note of some of the conclusions of these results,
as they suggest that in the case of networks where clustering exists (Stochas-
tic Block Model) and complete randomization is suggested (Erdős–Rényi), it
will be nearly guaranteed in the case of contributions to a public good that
at least one actor will not contribute. Additionally, when payoffs are signif-
icantly large (relatively speaking to the minimum eigenvalue of the graph),
more Nash equilibria will result, and therefore, many stable “solutions” for
actors to contribute to the public good will exist.
35
Bibliography
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